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Abstract 
 
Instant messaging has become a main form of 
communication between people. The ability to 
instantly send messages to each other, even when the 
recipient is offline, has become second nature and is 
taken for granted in modern society. However, this is 
not without a cost. In the case of instant messaging, 
that cost is privacy. Service providers use centralized 
servers to store these messages and can collect 
information using the messages ‘Metadata’ or even 
read the contents of messages. This paper presents a 
novel protocol, ATHiCC (Asynchronous Tor Hidden 
Chat Communication) [1] that allows private and 
anonymous communication that doesn't require a 
server, and yet is still able to support asynchronous 
communication. A simulator was implemented to test 
the protocol and performance under various network 
conditions and topologies. The results of the 
simulation predict high delivery rates and low delays 
in message delivery under most conditions, even in 
small network topologies.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Privacy is a fundamental human right, as 
recognized by the UN Declaration of Human Rights 
[2] and yet, recent events make it clear that internet 
users right to privacy is being violated. Governments 
are collecting more information than ever [3] and 
some of the biggest companies in the world use users’ 
personal data as a financial model e.g. Facebook and 
Google. 
Facebook, the biggest social network in the world, 
which was involved in a scandal leaking millions of 
users’ details [4], has one the most popular instant 
messaging applications on the market [5]. In 
“Messenger”, Facebook’s instant messaging 
application [6], conversations are not end-to-end 
encrypted by default, meaning Facebook can read the 
majority of messages sent.  
Even chat services that do implement end-to-end 
encryption by default can, and do, collect ‘metadata’. 
This metadata includes, but is not limited to, the 
sender, receiver, and location of the message. 
Therefore, even though the content of the message is 
secure, enough information can be deduced with the 
metadata to undermine the user’s privacy. 
Chat software that do put encryption and privacy 
at the top of their priority, like Telegram, get attacked 
by governments [7], and users are getting blocked 
from the service. This is relatively easy to achieve 
through the ISPs [8], since they can be forced to block 
access to the servers that host the chat service. 
These points have led the authors to conclude that 
there is a need for a fully distributed, autonomous 
instant messaging software that would be secure, 
private and anonymous, so that no user data can be 
collected. 
There are applications [9][10] that do provide these 
requirements, however they are not widely used as 
they are less usable than their popular counterparts and 
users often choose what they deem is secure enough 
over a more secure option that is less usable [11]. 
One of the main features missing from these 
programs, is one we take for granted in modern 
communication systems, namely, the ability to send 
messages in an asynchronous manner when the 
recipient is offline. This is because they rely on Peer-
to-Peer communication between clients which makes 
it challenging to support asynchronous features. 
The goal of this paper is to suggest a protocol that 
supports asynchronous messaging while being private, 
secure and fully distributed. This work is done by 
designing a protocol that uses other users in the 
network, in a unique fashion, while relying on the 
characteristics of Tor onion services to deliver 
asynchronous messages. The protocol is then tested 
using a simulation software developed to test the 
protocol’s performance under varying conditions. 
The outline of this paper is as follows; in Section 
2, an overview of related work is presented. In Section 
3 the conceptual framework around the protocol is laid 
out. Section 4 and Section 5 give the background and 
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details of the protocol. Section 6. contains the 
methodology for the simulation, and in Section 7 the 
results of the simulation are presented. Finally, Section 
8 and Section 9 discuss the considerations made in the 
design process and possible future work. 
 
2. Related Work 
 
Much work has been put into developing solutions 
for secure and private end-to-end encrypted 
communication. Many of these approaches either offer 
high levels of security and anonymity, but with a low 
number of features with respect to messaging. Others 
offer many features, but lower levels of security and 
anonymity. 
 
2.1. Ricochet 
 
Ricochet [10] is an example of a chat application 
which offers high-level security and anonymity by 
utilizing Tor [12] and Tor Onion Services [13]. It 
utilizes end-to-end encryption and guarantees that 
only the sender and receiver can read the content. 
By utilizing Tor Onion Services, it also eliminates 
any possibility that an entity can gather metadata or 
track who send which message. Furthermore, the 
application works autonomously without the need of 
any kind of servers for routing or connecting peers, 
since this is done by the Tor network. This means no 
one can track who is using the application, as all Tor 
traffic is indistinguishable [14]. This level of security 
and anonymity does come with a downside as 
Ricochet only works when both parties are online at 
the same time. 
 
2.2. Signal 
 
Signal is a chat protocol, developed by Open 
Whispers Systems in 2013 [15] and implemented into 
a number of different chat applications like, Signal 
[16], WhatsApp [17], secret conversations in 
Facebook Messenger  and Google Allo in incognito 
mode [18]. It offers a high level of security by enabling 
end-to-end encryption, with a different key for each 
message. Providing perfect forward secrecy, so that if 
one key is lost, no other messages can be decrypted. 
In Signal all messages are sent to a server, making 
it possible to send messages to users who are offline. 
This doesn’t allow the server to see the content of the 
messages, but all metadata can be collected. Signal is 
therefore considered as a secure, but not a private chat 
protocol.  
 
 
 
2.3. Tox 
 
Tox [9] is an encrypted instant messaging protocol, 
which provides peer-to-peer communication. It works 
by creating a network of users, who via an anonymous 
identifier connect and send messages to each other. 
The protocol employs perfect forward secrecy, just 
like Signal does. 
Tox doesn’t natively support asynchronous 
messages, it only implements a ‘pseudo-offline’ 
message [19], where a message is stored locally at the 
user, until both are online. Third-party developers 
have tried to solve this issue of Asynchronous 
messaging in two different ways: Relay through 
another user and relay through a decentralized server, 
called ‘supernodes’. 
None of the presented solutions combine both high 
levels of security and the possibility to send 
asynchronous messages and to the best of the authors 
knowledge, no other current solution on the market 
offer this. In this paper, such a solution will be 
presented. 
 
3. Conceptual Framework 
 
In this section we will present some of the concepts 
and terms needed in order to understand the design and 
functionality of the solution presented in this paper.  
 
3.1. Tor 
 
One of the main requirements set for the protocol 
is anonymity. In the context of this paper, maintaining 
anonymity means not disclosing any information 
which may indicate the identity of the user or their 
location, namely the IP address of the device. 
It was decided that the IP address would be kept 
private by designing the protocol over an Onion 
Routing network [18].  
Onion Routing [20] provides anonymous routing 
of data over the internet, by encapsulating data packets 
(including the IP layer headers) in encryption layers 
like an onion (hence the name). These packets are then 
sent through multiple proxies (Onion Routers), each 
removing a layer of encryption until the clear-text 
packet is sent by the last proxy to the destination. 
The Onion Routing network selected for the 
protocol is Tor [12], due to the scale and performance. 
In order to open secure connections over the Tor 
network, first a list of onion routers must be retrieved 
from a distributed hash table. Using this list, three 
random onion routers are picked which will function 
as proxies. Shared keys are then negotiated via 
TLS/SSLv3 with each of the onion routers and a path 
(tunnel) in the network is created.  
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When using Tor onion routing, even though the 
base packets are sent over TCP/IP, they cannot be 
traced back to their source, even by the receiver of the 
packet. However, as the packets leave the last leg of 
the path unencrypted, the payloads of said packets are 
not kept secure. 
 
3.2. Tor Onion Services 
 
Onion services [13] is a feature of the Tor network. 
Previously known as ‘Hidden Service’, Onion 
Services allow devices to provide services over the 
Tor network, without revealing their IP addresses, and 
thus their location. 
Onion services are made possible by having the 
service provider join the Tor network. This is done by 
the service creating a public-private key pair and an 
Onion address, as a subset of their public key. This 
Onion address is then published on the Tor distributed 
hash table, as well as addresses of other nodes known 
as ‘introduction points’ (IP). The IP make it possible 
to reach the Onion service provider, by forwarding 
packets through previously defined Tor connections to 
the service provider. Using the IP, a ‘Rendezvous 
Point’ (another Tor router) is agreed upon, and Tor 
connections and established to it by the requester and 
the service provider.  
 
Figure 1: Communication from a client to a Tor 
Onion Services, by using a rendezvous. 
 
Onion services provide multiple benefits to normal 
onion routing. First, they provide end-to-end address 
and payload encryption. Second, they don’t require 
that the sender of a packet know the IP address of the 
receiver. Instead they use Onion addresses which 
cannot be traced back to their owner. Third, by 
implementing Onion services on both communicating 
parties, a full duplex communication can be 
implemented which only sends packets through the 
Tor network, without sharing anything more than 
randomly generated Onion addresses. 
 
 
 
3.3. Centralized/decentralized/distributed 
 
Centralized Systems are systems which rely on a 
single entity for decision making, such as a server. 
This means that one entity (or a group of entities acting 
as one) provides a critical service for the function of 
the system.  
 
Figure 2: Difference between centralized, 
decentralized and distributed networks. 
Centralized systems, in server-client paradigms, 
are very common, as they are easy to maintain, 
manage and provide easy control of the system. 
Decentralized system are systems where a subset 
of the entities provides services and decision making 
to the rest of the network. These service-providing 
entities work independently of each other. 
Distributed systems are systems where all entities 
are equal. There are no nodes who are more 
‘important’ than other, and decision making is made 
on the individual level.  
 
3.4. Synchronous/asynchronous 
 
The basic functionality of any messaging 
application can be split into 2 kinds of messages. 
Synchronous and asynchronous messages. 
Synchronous communication refers to data sent while 
the recipient of the data is active and available. This 
means that in order to be able to use the service, both 
sender and receiver of the messages must be ‘online’ 
at the time of sending the messages. 
Asynchronous messages refer to data which is sent 
while the recipient is not available.  This data will be 
received by the recipient when, or shortly after, 
coming online. After sending the messages, 3rd parties 
provide services to ensure message delivery. 
 
4. Synchronous messaging 
 
The first, and simpler, aspect of the ATHiCC 
protocol relates to synchronous messages. These 
messages are to be sent directly, and as quickly as 
possible, to the other side of the conversation. 
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Due to the requirement of ATHiCC to be 
serverless, synchronous messages are sent in a peer-
to-peer method. 
In order to allow connections between nodes in the 
network, while maintaining anonymity, ATHiCC uses 
Tor Onion Services in order to establish the 
connections. In order for a node to use the protocol, 
they must create an Onion Service, and therefore 
generate an Onion Address. The Onion Address is then 
exchanged off-band with other users who wish to 
communicate over the protocol. In the asynchronous 
messaging section, this Onion Address is referred to as 
the ‘private address’. 
Whenever a node requests to open a session (start 
a conversation) with another node, the former must use 
the latter’s Onion Address in order to contact them. 
Once the Tor connection is established, and a 
connection request is received, the receiver 
authenticates the requester’s Onion Address. If the 
address is approved by the receiver, a communication 
channel is established.  
After the first time an address is approved, 
subsequent connections will be accepted with an 
‘already known’ response in the authentication 
process. Once 2 nodes have performed the first 
authentication and connection, they are considered 
‘contacts’ of each other. 
As every node has their own Onion Service, they 
can be contacted, and receive connection requests 
(‘Contact’ requests) from any other node who has their 
Onion Address. Therefore, the Onion Address should 
be kept private and shared only with contacts one 
wishes to establish connections with. 
Once the ‘contact’ relationship is established, the 
nodes are able to freely send packets over a TCP 
connection through a secure tunnel created by the Tor 
network. 
 
5. Asynchronous messaging 
 
The main difficulty of sending Asynchronous 
messages in a distributed system comes from the need 
of 3rd party services for hosting of messages between 
sending and delivery, as there are no entities in the 
network which guarantee their availability (as is 
common in centralized and decentralized networks). 
The solution proposed in this paper was named the 
‘P.O Box’ solution due to its similarity to services 
offered by the Post Office. In this solution other nodes 
in the network provide message hosting services while 
the recipient is offline.  
This section will describe the solution designed to 
provide the Asynchronous messaging features of 
ATHiCC. 
 
5.1. Double addresses 
 
As with traditional P.O Boxes, every node which 
provides messages hosting services has a unique 
identifier. In ATHiCC, this unique identifier is an 
Onion Address, used in order to access the Onion 
service offered by the P.O Box. 
However, the Onion address of a node is also used 
in order to send ‘Contact requests’ and messages to 
each node. In order to provide privacy and avoid social 
engineering techniques, such as phishing, the 
ATHiCC protocol defines both a private and a public 
onion address for each node. The private address is 
shared and used for Synchronous messaging and 
‘Contact requests’, while the public addresses are only 
used for providing P.O Box services. 
By defining a public and private address for each 
node, the protocol also maintains privacy of addresses 
in small networks where the topology could be 
inferred due to the distribution of P.O Box addresses. 
  
5.2. The P.O box solution 
 
The P.O Box solution provides Asynchronous 
messaging by utilizing message hosting services 
provided by other nodes in the network. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: First step of asynchronous messaging. 
 
The first step of the Asynchronous messaging 
starts with each node performing a ‘P.O Box 
association’ process, in which a node (the ‘P.O Box’) 
agrees to provide message hosting services for another 
node (the ‘Receiver’). This association process 
produces a P.O Box Token, which contains needed 
information such as P.O Box address, association 
unique identifier and proof of ownership of the token. 
In order to increase the reliability of the protocol, 
each Receiver node performs P.O Box association 
processes with multiple nodes, and thus has multiple 
P.O Boxes to use. Figure 3 depicts the first step of the 
asynchronous messaging process. 
Once a P.O Box association process is complete, 
the Receiver node publishes their Token (excluding 
the proof of ownership) to all their contacts, informing 
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them of the P.O Boxes the Receiver node is using. 
Token publishing is performed synchronously 
whenever nodes connect for the first time or whenever 
they have a synchronous connection. Token 
publishing is also performed Asynchronously when a 
new P.O Box association is performed. Figure 4 
depicts the second step.  
 
 
Figure 4: Second step of asynchronous 
messaging. 
 
By presenting the Token to the P.O Box the Sender 
shows proof that they are allowed to upload 
Asynchronous messages to P.O Box, addressed to the 
owner of the token. In order to increase the reliability 
of the protocol, the Sender will upload the same 
message to multiple P.O Boxes used by the Receiver. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Third step of asynchronous messaging. 
 
Once messages are uploaded to the P.O Box, the 
Receiver node is able to collect them at any time the 
P.O Box is online. Once the Receiver node comes 
online, they query all their online P.O boxes for 
messages, presenting the ‘proof of ownership’ agreed 
upon during the association process. Until all P.O 
boxes have been queried, the Receiver node would 
continue to query them at fixed intervals. 
The protocol relies on probability. Out of the list of 
P.O. Boxes used by the Receiver, at least one P.O Box 
would need to be online both at the time of sending the 
message and while the Receiver is online next. By 
adjusting the number of P.O Boxes used by the nodes, 
a balance between reliability and network load can be 
achieved.  
 
Figure 6: Fourth step of asynchronous 
messaging. 
 
In order to address the potential of missed 
messages, the protocol includes a process for repeating 
previously sent messages in a sliding window, as well 
as a synchronous ‘Synchronization’ process used to 
exchange previously missed messages, once Sender 
and Receiver are online at the same time. 
Finally, in order to address potential misuse of the 
protocol, it defines methods for ranking and 
‘blacklisting’ nodes based on their success rates and 
misuse. Identification of misuse is done using 
confirmation receipts from the P.O Box to the Sender, 
which are then presented to the Receiver during the 
synchronous ‘Synchronization’ process. 
 
5.3. Distribution 
 
The distributed nature of the solution presents a 
major challenge. As there are no central entities in the 
network, the only nodes known to each node are those 
they know as ‘Contacts’. Relying on contacts alone to 
perform P.O Box services would mean a low 
reliability for nodes with few contacts, as well as 
breach the privacy of the users by publishing a list of 
their contacts as P.O Boxes.  
In order to allow any node to perform the role of 
P.O. Box for any other node, the protocol defines a 
propagation method for addresses. This process allows 
the public addresses of nodes to be published 
throughout the network, so they may provide services 
to previously unknown nodes. 
To support address propagation, the protocol relies 
on the publishing of Tokens, used as part of the 
asynchronous messaging process. As each Token 
includes the public address of the P.O, contacts of a 
specific node learn the public addresses known by that 
node. Once they learn a new public address, they may  
initiate P.O Box association with that node as well, 
depending on their current need for more P.O Boxes. 
Otherwise, the contacts would add the address to their 
list of ‘known P.O Boxes’. Figure 7 shows the 
propagation of addresses by Token publishing.  
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Figure 7: Propagation of P.O. Box addresses by 
Token publishing. 
 
 As each node in the network shares its own P.O 
Boxes, the addresses would propagate throughout the 
connected network graph. In order to facilitate the 
spread of addresses, and to distribute the load on the 
different nodes, P.O Box associations are maintained 
for a fixed period of time. Once an association ‘times 
out’, a new node is selected at random from the list of 
known public addresses, with exclusion of addresses 
which are ‘blacklisted’ or have previously shown low 
reliability, when compared to the other known nodes. 
 
 
Figure 8: States of a small network before (A) and 
after (B) connecting to a larger network. 
 
 
 
This method has a weakness in small, closed 
networks of contacts. Should a small number of nodes 
all share the same connections to other nodes, the only 
nodes available to propagate are in that subset. 
However, once the small network is connected to 
another network through any node, all connected 
addresses should spread. Figure 8 shows the states for 
a small network before and after connecting to a larger 
network though a single node. This behavior is 
simulated in the simulation when address propagation 
is looked into. 
 
6. Simulation  
 
To test that the protocol works and scales, independent 
of the network size, or network topology, a 
verification or test method is needed. We have 
identified two key aspects of the protocol to test which 
are needed to assess its viability. These are the 
‘messages sent and receive success rate’, and the 
‘propagation of P.O. Box addresses’. For this purpose, 
a network simulation was designed and implemented 
[21]. 
The simulation was designed to test several 
hypotheses. These hypotheses helped scope the 
simulation and focused the analysis of the data, as well 
as assessing if the simulation worked as expected. For 
the analysis, we assumed that the simulation worked 
as expected, meaning no errors or bugs in the code 
were present to an extent where the data would be 
corrupted. 
The hypotheses were split into two different parts: 
Propagation of P.O. Box addresses and 
Asynchronous message delivery. Where only one 
hypothesis was tested regarding P.O. Box address 
propagation and several regarding Asynchronous 
message delivery. Below are the hypotheses that were 
tested: 
 
1. The average number of known P.O. Box 
addresses will increase over time. 
2. The more time users spend online in a given 
period, the higher percentage of 
Asynchronous messages will get delivered. 
3. The more time users spend online in a given 
period, the faster Asynchronous messages 
will be delivered. 
4. The more P.O. Boxes a user sends an 
Asynchronous message to, the higher 
percentage of the messages will get 
delivered. 
5. The more P.O. Boxes a user sends an 
Asynchronous message to, the faster the 
messages will arrive. 
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In the simulation two types of datasets were used. 
First, a small star topology was generated. It was used 
to test that the protocol could work in small topologies, 
and for testing Asynchronous messaging success rates. 
A small topology is sufficient as the size of the 
network is not a significant factor for messages. This 
is due to the limited number of nodes involved in 
asynchronous message sending, in contrast to address 
propagation. 
For large scale testing, mainly to test P.O. Box 
propagation, it was necessary to get a topology that is 
large enough and made up of different sub topologies. 
In order to best simulate the behavior of a system 
based on the THiCC protocol in a real-world 
environment, the network topology should resemble a 
real-world network as closely as possible. 
Furthermore, it needed to be temporal, meaning 
new connections between nodes are timestamped. This 
is so we can observe the graph growth over time and 
simulate how a network would grow. Since an instant 
messaging is made up of friends or people who have a 
relationship, it would likely take a similar topology to 
a social network, which is a complex network [22]. 
There are two ways to get such a topology: generate 
one using an algorithm; or use an existing topology. 
To make sure the simulation is as close to reality as 
possible, a real network topology was used from the 
Digg social network [23]. The Digg topology is made 
up of millions of nodes, so a slice in time was used 
instead of the full topology. 
In a real scenario, every node in the network is a 
real person with a different use case and behavior, 
mostly different online times and online periods. In the 
simulation all P.O. Boxes and clients share the same 
overall online time statistics. This also means that the 
algorithm for prioritizing P.O. Boxes was not 
implemented since its irrelevant to prioritize identical 
nodes. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2. Data output 
 
The simulator takes a configuration file as an input. 
This configuration file includes the global variables 
that affect the behavior of the network or the nodes. 
These configurations control for example the topology 
to use, online frequency for the nodes and the number 
of P.O. Boxes to use. 
For each of these configuration inputs, the 
simulation outputs data. First, is every message that 
was sent including its origin, target, sent time and 
optionally received time.  With this data, it is possible 
to determine the success rate of messages sent, as well 
as the average time a message takes to arrive. Second, 
the simulation outputs which P.O. Boxes were known 
to which nodes and at what time-point. Using this 
information, it is possible to map out the rate and 
efficiency at which P.O. Boxes propagate through the 
system. 
 
7. Results  
 
First, we set out to test the hypothesis regarding the 
propagation of P.O. Box addresses throughout a large 
network. To test this hypothesis, a simulation was run 
on a large-scale network, using a topology from a 
social network site. The iteration when an address was 
shared to each node was logged and grouped into 10 
equal phases (for ease of analysis).  
Figure 9 shows the average number of P.O Box 
addresses known by the nodes in the network, over the 
‘phase’. One phase is simply a tenth of the iterations. 
As seen in Figure 9, the results of the simulation 
support the first hypothesis that he ‘the average 
number of known P.O. Box addresses will increase 
over time’, by showing that average known number of 
P.O. Boxes increases steadily over the separate phases. 
This suggests that given enough time, a large network 
which is structured and grows like a real social 
Figure 9: Average number of known P.O. Box addresses at each phase 
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network would allow the nodes to learn new addresses. 
  
 
Figure 10: Delivery percentage (blue) and 
message delivery time (red) by differing online 
ratios 
 
The second and third hypothesis refer to the online 
time or ‘online ratio’. For this purpose, the simulation 
included several test runs. Each run was configured to 
run with identical configurations, with the only 
difference being the ‘online ratio’ (the percentage of 
time the node spends online in a period). The 
expectation is that the longer a node is online, the 
better chances it has to deliver a message and will 
therefore do so faster.  
As seen in Figure 10, the delivery percentage 
increases and the message delivery time decreases as 
the online ratio increases. This means that the more 
time a node spends online, the more likely it is for that 
node to receive the asynchronous messages sent to it, 
and the faster it will receive them. These observations 
support the hypothesis presented earlier and suggests 
that the simulation behaves as expected.  
Another consideration is what happens when a 
node wanted to send an asynchronous message, but it 
did not have any online P.O. Boxes to deliver the 
message to. This would not register as a message that 
was sent and not delivered, it would instead not be sent 
at all. However, for the receiving node the result is 
similar, where the asynchronous message did not 
come across. Figure 11 illustrates how many messages 
failed to upload to P.O Boxes at all at each different 
online ratio.  
 
Figure 11: Upload failed percentage over different 
online ratios. 
 
The results of the simulation suggest that a network 
with nodes which is spend less time online are less 
likely to be able to send the messages at all. Further 
analysis shows that any message which has failed to 
upload was attempted during the first quarter of the 
simulation. This suggests that this behavior is caused 
by a low propagation of P.O Box addresses in the early 
stages of the network. 
These final two hypotheses consider the number of 
P.O. Boxes used in the delivery of messages. The 
expectation is that the more boxes used, the higher the 
chance the messages will be delivered and the less 
time it would take. Figure 12 shows the delivery 
percentage and message delivery time by the number 
of P.O. Boxes used by each message.  
As expected, the observation shows that an 
increase in the number of P.O. Boxes used has an 
impact on both the message delivery time and delivery 
percentage. The higher the number of P.O. Boxes 
used, the more reliable and the higher performance 
you get from the protocol in terms of delivery 
percentage and message delivery time.  
 
 
Figure 12: Delivery percentage (red) and message 
delivery time (blue) by different number of P.O. 
Boxes used. 
 
To support this observation, a significance test was 
conducted which shows that the delivery percentage 
and message delivery time’ are significantly** 
different from all the values being equal. Furthermore, 
no significant difference could be found from 
choosing four, five or six P.O boxes. In addition, a F-
test showed significant** difference between three 
and four P.O Boxes used. This suggests that four P.O. 
Boxes is fitting number for the configuration, given 
the other configurations used.  
The hypothesis which were presented and analyzed 
were helpful to determine how the protocol behaves in 
a simulated environment, and the review the reliability 
of the simulator to work as expected. In addition to 
reviewing the way the nodes using the protocol can 
send and receive messages, the overall performance of 
the protocol can be reviewed. As seen the in previous 
figures, the protocol can reach message delivery 
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probabilities of about 98-99% in the simulated 
environment, depending on the configurations used. 
While this does not guarantee a reliable 
performance in a real-life environment, it suggests that 
the protocol could work and is worth further 
investigation. 
 
8. Discussion  
 
In this research paper we have presented a novel, 
fully distributed, private and anonymous instant 
messaging protocol, which also supports 
asynchronous messaging. This protocol is built on top 
of Tor onion services. 
Analyzing the results of the simulation, we predict 
that the protocol will perform with a high degree of 
reliability and low delays in delivering messages. 
However, since the protocol doesn’t use name servers 
due to the requirement of full distribution, different 
networks of users are not forced to merge, and 
therefore, situations may occur where a network is too 
small to have enough P.O. boxes to provide the 
redundancy needed for high degrees of reliability. 
However, this is a small limitation, as the protocol is 
designed to ensure that once any node in a network 
connects to a node from a different network, the P.O. 
box addresses will propagate. 
To verify and test the protocol, we used a 
simulation software, intended to test the key aspects of 
the protocol such as the P.O. box propagation and 
message delivery rates and delays. However, the 
simulation is implemented such that all the nodes have 
the same Online/Offline characteristics. This means all 
nodes, on average, are online the same proportion of 
the simulation time (but not necessarily the same 
times). This behavior is unlikely in a “real life” 
environment, where users have varying behaviors and 
patterns, and it may be worth running the simulation 
with real user online time data. Yet, we predict it 
would not vary the results significantly. 
Another consideration was whether or not to 
formally verify the protocol [24][25]. On the one hand, 
verifying the protocol could definitely prove the it 
would work, on the other hand, it would not indicate 
anything about performance, which is critical in this 
case, and therefore a simulation was chosen. 
An implementation of ATHiCC would surely be in 
a context, where total anonymity and high levels of 
security is required. Such implementations would 
include messaging software for intelligence services 
and undercover journalist, for whom being anonymous 
and hidden might in extreme cases mean the difference 
between life and death. Military use would also be 
suitable case, in times when existing network 
infrastructure can be used. 
The authors are aware that this protocol might be 
used by individuals with malicious intents, to 
communicate and plan, limiting the possibilities law 
enforcement agencies might have. We believe that it is 
impossible to create technologies which is only used 
for good intents and this protocol is no different.   
 
9. Conclusion and Future Work 
 
In this paper, a design of an instant messaging 
protocol is described. The aim was to allow 
asynchronous messaging while also maintaining 
privacy, anonymity, security and availability of the 
system for the users. After the protocol was designed, 
a simulation was performed, and the results show that 
the protocol performs as expected, even under strained 
conditions. 
In the future, we would seek to add the ability to 
conduct group chats as we deem this the most 
important feature to allow a software based on the 
protocol to compete in the current market of instant 
messaging applications. This is however, technically 
challenging, as currently, asynchronous group 
encryption remains an unsolved problem if we exclude 
N times protocols where a key exchange with each 
person in the group is required. This is especially true 
without a central entity like a server. However, future 
work on the MLS protocol [26] may prove to be a 
possible solution. 
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